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I f several persons wish to join together in a common
enterprise in order to pool their capital or labor or some
of earn, they may choose among a variety of available
organizational structures that will serve that purpose. The
most common entity forms are partnerships (including
joint ventures), corporations, and trusts. While, in its
typical structure, each of those entity forms has its own
distinct characteristics, the structure of such organizations often is modified by agreement so as to adopt
attributes of another type of entity. Because of this, the
substantive distinction between entity types is blurred.
Howeve~ tax law's treatment of these entities is dissimilar in many important respects. For example, partnerships pay no federal income taxes. In this respect, the
partnership serves as a conduit in that all of its income,
losses, deductions, credits, and other tax attributes are
passed through to its partners who report those items on
their own tax returns. A corporation, on the other hand,
is subject to a federal income tax. The typical domestic
corporation is taxed on its income regardless of whether it
retains that income or distributes its earnings to its shareholders by way of dividends. Corporate income is sometimes said to be subjected to a double tax-once when
earned by the corporation and again when distributed to
its shareholders. Certain closely held corporations are
permitted to elect under Subchapter S to be excused from
income tax liability on most (or perhaps all) of their income and to have most (or perhaps all) of their income,
deductions, credits, and other tax items pass through to
the corporation's shareholders in a manner that is similar
to the pass-through treatment provided for partnerships
and partners. Such electing corporations are referred to
as "S Corporations." Corporations which are not S corporations are sometimes referred to as "C Corporations."
Unlike a partnership, an S corporation is subjected to
federal income lax liability in certain narrow circumstances, but for the most part, an S corporation will pay
no federal income taxes.
A trust is liable for federal income taxes on its retained
income, but to the extent that the trust makes (or is required to make) a current distribution of its income to its
beneficiaries, such income will be taxed in the hands of
the beneficiaries rather than the trust. Thus, a required or
actual distribution by a trust will cause all or some of its
income to be passed through to its beneficiaries, but the
remaining trust income is taxed to the trust itself. Credits
generally pass through to the beneficiaries. Deductions
sometimes pass through and sometimes are available
only to the trust.
The foregoing cursory description of entities and their
tax treatment raises several fundamental questions.
Should the tax treatment of all entities be the same or
should there be disparate treatment? If there is to be disparate treatment, should the treatment depend upon the
traditional classification of entities as corporations, partnerships, or trusts? If so, should the tax law's characterization of an organization rest on its characterization
for local law purposes or should characterization be determined according to a federally established standard?

Alternatively, should the tax characterization of an organization tum exclusively on an election by the members of
the organization?
The tax law's current response to those questions is to
characterize organizations according to federally created
standards and to treat each entity type differently. Thus,
an organization that is treated as a partnership for state
law purposes may be treated as an association taxable as a
corporation for tax purposes. The standards employed in
determining the tax classification of entities were established in the Supreme Court's 1935 decision in Morrissey v.
Commissioner, and they are sometimes referred to as the
Morrissey standards.

... an organization that is treated as a
partnership for state law purposes may be
treated as an association taxable as a corporation for tax purposes.

The history of the government's application of the

Morrissey standards to partnerships is instructive in that
there were dramatic shifts in the government's position as
the benefits and detriments to taxpayers of corporate tax
treatment waxed and waned. Initially, the government
sought to impose corporate tax treatment on partnerships
to the extent that it could do so under the Morrissey standards. The government's purpose was to maximize the
reach of the double tax imposition that applies to corporate entities but not to partnerships. However, there are
tax advantages to corporate treatment that mitigate or
even offset the double tax cost.
Until recently, one of the tax advantages of corporate
classification was a more liberal statutory deferred compensation treatment for shareholder-employees of a
closely held corporation than was available to members
of a partnership. Beginning with the early 1950s, many
closely held organizations were incorporated for that
purpose. Since, at that time, state laws prohibited
professionals from incorporating, some professional
partnerships successfully sought to be classified under
the Morrissey standards as associations that are treated as
corporations for tax purposes. To combat that effort, in
1960, the government promulgated regulations which
adopted the Morrissey standards but construed them in
such manner as to make it difficult for a partnership to be
treated as a corporation. Many states responded to the
1960 regulations by authorizing professionals to incorporate, and so was born the "professional corporation." The
government then promulgated a regulation which set
forth standards for corporate characterization that were
designed to exclude professional corporations. After a
number of courts held this "anti-professional corporation"
regulatory provision to be invalid, the government
revoked it fu 1977.
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Subsequently, the statutory provisions for deferred
compensation were altered by Congress so that there is
little difference between the provisions for self-employed
participants and those for employees. That change
removed one of the major incentives for corporate
characterization.
The focus of the characterization dispute shifted once
again. With deferred compensation plans no longer a significant consideration, the government turned its attention to the area of tax shelters. Tax sheltered investments
are designed to provide sheltered income for the investors or generate deductions or credits that the investors
can use to shelter outside income. A corporation typically
is not a useful entity for the conduct of a tax sheltered
operation since the tax benefits generated by the corporation will not pass through to its shareholders. In some
cases, an S corporation can be useful, but the requirements for qualifying as an S corporation are such that few
tax shelter operations could qualify. Consequently, a partnership, especially a limited partnership, form has been
the most popular entity for conducting such investments.

... the government has returned to its
pre-professional association position of
seeking to impose corporate characterization to the broadest extent possible.

The government had sought through legislative proposals and through litigation to eliminate tax shelters or
to minimize the tax benefits which such investments are
designed to obtain. To the same aim, the government has
sought to prevent investors from securing such tax benefits by recharacterizing the partnership or trust which
conducts the sheltering activity as a corporation for tax
purposes. Thus, the government has returned to its preprofessional association position of seeking to impose
corporate characterization to the broadest extent possible.
As to partnerships, the government's litigating efforts
were thwarted by the regulations it adopted in 1960,
which are designed to make corporate characterization
more difficult to obtain and therefore to impose. In its
1976 decision in Philip G. Larsen, the Tax Court established
criteria that make it extremely difficult to reclassify a partnership as a corporation, and the Commissioner was constrained to adopt the Larsen position. As a result,
relatively few limited partnerships are at risk of being
reclassified, and general partnerships are virtually
immune.
'Ilusts are also vulnerable to reclassification for tax
purposes. In fact, the Morrissey case itself involved the
classification of a trust as an association taxable as a
corporation. The government has recently promulgated
proposed regulations and rulings that would reclassify
certain types of trusts, but, these rules have not yet been
tested in court.
24

In general, incorporated organizations have withstood
any effort to reclassify them as partnerships or other
unincorporated entities. Howeve~ problems similar to
characterization have plagued corporate entities. In some
circumstances, persons who wished to do business as a
partnership or as a sole proprietor have had to incorporate an activity to satisfy (or to avoid) some state law requirement. The most common illustration of this is where
a real estate operation incorporates to obtain a construction loan and permanent financing. State usury laws do
not apply to corporate borrowers. If the permissible rate
under the usury law is lower than prevailing commercial
rates, the lender will only make the loan to a corporate
borrower. To comply with the lender's demand, the land
is placed in a newly formed corporation which then borrows the funds needed for construction. In such cases,
the charter of the corporate borrower may describe it as a
udummy" that was created solely to borrow the funds
needed for construction. The corporation will be liquidated as soon as construction is completed and the permanent financing is obtained. The shareholders have
then attempted to treat the incorporated entity as a sham
so that the entity will be ignored for tax purposes and
the organization treated as a partnership or sole proprietorship. With few exceptions, shareholders have been
unsuccessful in such attempts, and the courts have sustained the viability of the corporate entity. To obtain partnership treatment in such cases, the shareholders will
have to liquidate the corporation which may cause them
to incur substantial tax liability especially if the corporation is deemed to be a collapsible corporation.
Faced with the Commissioner's and the courts'
unwillingness to treat such real estate corporations as
shams, shareholders tried a different approach. They
formed a corporation to serve as an agent for the shareholders, and they transferred title to the realty to the corporation in its agency capacity. By so structuring the
transaction, they hoped to permit the corporation to borrow the needed funds without saddling the operation
with corporate tax treatment. It is a matter of state law
whether such an arrangement will successfully evade
usury law restrictions.
The Commissioner generally challenges the validity of
such agency relationships and contends that the corporation is to be treated as the owner of the realty which it
purportedly holds as agent for the transferors. The criteria for determining whether the agency relationship is
valid were set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in
National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
National Carbide established six standards or criteria of
which the fifth has proven to be the most important. The
fifth standard requires that a corporation's agency relationship with its principals not be dependent on their
shareholder status for the agency relationship to be
treated as valid. Although the Tax Court disagrees, several courts of appeals (the Fourth and Fifth Circuits) have
held that the fifth standard must be satisfied to obtain
agency status regardless of whether the other five
National Carbide standards are met. The Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have construed that fifth standard so strictly as to

make it difficult for a corporation to qualify as an agent of
its shareholders. However, if the transferors of the realty
to the corporate agent are not the sharel,lolders of the corporation, or if the shareholders own only a portion of the
equity interests in the transferred property, the validity
of the agency relationship likely will be recognized. E.g.,
Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984). So,
if a law firm were to form a corporation which serves as
an agent of the firm's clients, it appears that the firm
could borrow the needed funds and construct the
property without subjecting its principles to corporate tax
treatment.
The various tests employed to determine the characterization of an organization are designed to measure the
extent to which an organization's attributes more closely
resemble those of one type of entity rather than another.
Thus, if the characteristics of an organization that is
classified as a limited partnership under state law more
closely resemble the attributes of a typical corporation,
the organization will be treated as an association taxable
as a corporation. Given that purpose, there are reasons to
question whether the Morrissey standards are appropriate
criteria especially in light of the diversity of forms that

The various tests employed to determine
the characterization of an organization are
designed to measure the extent to which
an organization's attributes more closely
resemble those of one type of entity
rather than another.

are now employed for each of such entities. But a more
fundamental issue is whether the reclassification of
entities is justified as a matter of tax policy. In other
words, there may be no good reason for tax law to classify an entity as anything other than the classification
chosen by the taxpayers regardless of the entity's
characteristics.
First, let us consider whether there is any justification
for reclassifying a limited partnership as a corporation.
The corporate income that is distributed to a shareholder
typically is subjected to double taxation-once in the
hands of the corporation and again when it is distributed
to a shareholder. There is substantial support for the view
that this double taxation of corporate income is undesirable both for reasons of economic policy and of equity. If
it were administratively feasible, it would be desirable to
integrate the corporation's income with the individual
shareholder's personal income and apply a single tax.
The Subchapter S provisions demonstrate that in circumstances where the administration of an integrated tax system is manageable, Congress has permitted an election
to integrate. The principal differences between the Subchapter S provisions and the provisions of Subchapter K
(the partnership provisions) are those provisions of Sub-

chapter S that are designed to prevent a perceived abuse
where the S election is made by a corporation that had
previously been operating as a C corporation. Congress
feared that otherwise the shareholders could obtain the
future income of the organization free of a corporate tax
without first having to liquidate the corporation and
cause the shareholders to recognize gain thereby. The
provisions in Subchapter S that deal with this problem
apply only to capital gains and to passive investment
income.
So long as the allocation of partnership income among
the various partners is administratively manageable,
there is no reason to impose a double tax on partnership
income. The integration of such income with that of the
partners, as is done by Subchapter K, is unobjectionable.
Since a corporate organization cannot be converted to a
partnership without liquidating the corporation, the
special Subchapter S problems concerning capital gains
and passive investment income do not arise in the partnership area.
The major concerns over the classification of limited
partnerships arise because of a partnership's capacity to
pass through to its partners favorable tax attributes such
as artificially created tax losses and tax credits. The partnership is the favored entity of the infamous tax sheltered
investments. Tax shelters are spawned by tax preferences
that typically are deliberately created by Congress for
some economic or social purpose-e.g., highly accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits. If these
preferences are designed to encourage certain types of
investments, it would seem appropriate to permit the
investments to be made by a group of people joining together as well as by a single investor. Indeed, there has
been no objection to a general partnership's engaging in a
tax sheltered investment. The attack has been directed at
limited partnerships because limited partners have no liability to contribute additional amounts to the partnership
or to pay its creditors.
A maJor objection has been raised to providing a person tax benefits, such as depreciation deductions, in an
amount that exceeds the aggregate contributions of that
person to the enterprise plus the total liability of that person for additional contributions. This situation can arise
as a consequence of the "basis" rules that comprise the
so-called Crane doctrine for the treatment of nonrecourse
debt. The problem caused by nonrecourse debt is not
peculiar to limited partnerships; it can arise where any
party, even a single individual, acquires property subject
to a debt for which the acquiring party is not personally
liable. There is no reason to deprive a limited partner of
the tax benefits that flow from the partnership's basis in
property acquired through a nonrecourse debt. No property owner-general partner or sole investor-has any
greater liability for the repayment of a nonrecourse debt
than does a limited partner. Current law recognizes this,
and treats a limited partner the same as a general partner
in determining the bases that they acquire in their partnership interests as a result of the partnership's nonrecourse debt.
That is not to say that the current treatment of non25

recourse debts is correct. It is merely that there is no
reason to distinguish limited partnerships from other
investors in dealing with such debts. There are some who
believe that the Crane rule should be modified or even
repudiated. Regardless of the merits of that contention,
the problem arises out of the Crane doctrine, and it is that
doctrine that should be addressed directly rather than
making a piecemeal attack on it by reclassifying some
partnerships as corporations.
Another means of dealing with the nonrecourse debt
problem is the imposition of"at risk" rules such as those
imposed by §465 and §46(c)(8) of the Code. Currently
those rules are insufficient because there are several areas
where they do not apply-notably, real estate investments. The pending tax reform bill (H.R. 3838) would
cure that problem by expanding the scope of the at risk
rules so that they apply to many (but not all) real estate
holdings. The bill also would repeal the investment tax
credit and reduce the permissible rate of depreciation.

... an ideal tax structure would integrate
all business income with the personal
income of the individuals who have the
beneficial interest in the organization

The partnership's recourse debts do not open any
doors to avenues for tax abuse. A limited partner enjoys
limited liability as to the partnership's recourse debts. A
partner can deduct his share of partnership losses only to
the extent of his outside basis in his partnership interest
(§704(d)), and a limited partner gets no addition to his
outside basis because of a partnership's recourse debts.
Consequently, a limited partner's exemption from liability
precludes him from obtaining any tax benefit from such
debts, and no tax abuse can occur because of such debts.
In sum, there is no justification for the Commissioner
or the courts to challenge the classification of a partnership. The Commissioner has used reclassification as
an oblique attack against tax provisions that the Commissioner deems undesirable where a frontal attack on such
treatment does not seem promising. While the Commissioner's behavior is understandable, it would be more
efficient and equitable to require either the courts or the
legislature to face the underlying problem directly rather
than to dilute its significance through the reclassifying of
a relatively few organizations.
Similarly, it is inappropriate to impose extraordinary
requirements for a corporation to qualify as an agent of its
shareholders. The Tax Court has come to that conclusion,
but the Commissioner rejects it, and he has the support
of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. It is especially inappropriate to impose such requirements where knowledgeable parties easily sidestep this obstacle by having a
corporation which is formed and controlled by the shareholders' lawyers hold the property as the transferors'
agent and obtain the needed financing.
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For the same reasons, the characterization of a trust
should not be challenged regardless of whether the beneficiaries have different types of interests in the trust. One
problem here is that persons might be able to create a
trust to which they each contribute their stock holdings in
order to diversify their portfolio without recognizing a
gain as would be required by §351(e)(l) or §721(b) if the
transfers were made to a corporation or to a partnership.
But, that problem exists for fixed investment trusts that
the regulations acknowledge cannot be reclassified.
[Treas. Reg. §301.7701-4(c)]. If this is a problem, it should
be dealt with by amending Subchapter J rather than by
attempting to reclassify some trusts.
Another reclassification issue arises where two or more
persons acquire property as co-tenants and divide the income from the property among themselves. In some circumstances, the Service will seek to impose partnership
status on that activity, which classification can have detrimental consequences to one or more of the parties. The
only justification for imposing partnership status is to facilitate administration of the tax laws. It would seem that
reclassification as a partnership should not be imposed
unless the nature of the cooperative activity is such that it
would be cumbersome to deal with it as representing an
aggregate of interests rather than as a separate entity.
However, in determining whether a tenancy in common
should be reclassified, neither the courts nor the Service
has addressed that question and instead they seek to
resolve this issue according to mechanical standards that
do not appear to be particularly relevant.
On the other hand, where several persons attempt to
characterize an employment or loan arrangement as a
partnership, the government has a legitimate interest in
ignoring their formal characterization. This is to prevent
the transmutation of compensation for services or for the
use of funds, which would be ordinary income to the
recipient, into a "partnership distribution" which may
permit a deferral of income or capital gains treatment.
Precluding partnership treatment is one means of preventing such abuses.
Two questions more fundamental than entity reclassification are whether there is any justification for having
two different tax schemes for business organizations
(i.e., a double tax system and a pass-through tax system)
and, if so, whether the choice of the applicable system
should depend upon whether the organization is a corporation or a partnership. Regarding the first question, as
previously noted, an ideal tax structure would integrate
all business income with the personal income of the individuals who have the beneficial interest in the organization. The major objection to a fully integrated system
(i.e., a pass-through tax structure) is that the forms of
equitable ownership of a corporation can be extremely
complex. For example, different classes of corporate stock
can provide different income rights, and there can be
multiple tiers of corporate engagement in investments.
A corporate tax system addresses this complexity.
For many years, the partnership form typically was
employed in uncomplicated circumstances so the passthrough system operated quite well for those organiza-

tions. The provision of different tax treatment for partnerships is arbitrary in that it excludes those corporate
enterprises that have uncomplicated forms of shareholder
ownership and includes partnerships that have complex
structures. The adoption of an arbitrary line of distinction
is justified as a means of avoiding the administrative
chaos that would follow from a rule requiring ad hoc determinations of the degree of an organization's complexity. The prejudice to small corporations is alleviated by
the availability of the Subchapter S election.
Currently, the forms of ownership of partnership interests of some large limited partnerships have become as
complex as those of many large corporations. The question arises whether such partnerships should be given
pass-through treatment. The 'freasury addressed this
issue in its first Tax Reform proposal (freasury I) when it
proposed to treat a limited partnership with more than 35
partners as a corporation. This proposal was dropped by
ueasury when it promulgated its revised version (freasury II), sometimes referred to as the President's proposal.
The number of persons who own an interest in an
organization should not be a factor in its classification. In
that regard, the 35 shareholder limit on S corporations
should be re-examined. Since the audit process focuses
on the organization itself, there is no administrative difficulty in applying pass-through treatment to any number
of persons provided that they are identified at the entity
level.
Another question is whether the tax treatment of an
organization should be determined by criteria that measure the relative difficulty of administering a pass-through
system rather than by whether the organization is incorporated. Thus, an uncomplicated ownership form
would have pass-through treatment, and a complicated
ownership form would have a tax imposed at the entity
level. Such a system would be extremely difficult to
administer especially since the ownership of an organization can change from time to time and may thereby
become more or less complex. The corporate-partnership
division is a relatively easy one to administer and may
well be preferable, provided that the typical corporation
or partnership fits the complex or simple ownership pattern and provided that provision is made for those organizations which do not fall within the expected degree of
complexity or simplicity. The Subchapter S election is a
good device for dealing with these problems for incorporated organizations. It is elective so that an incorporated
organization which does not wish to be subjected to the
complexity of the pass-through system (and of the possible involuntary termination of pass-through treatment)
need not have it imposed. While the Subchapter S provisions were liberalized in 1982, they might be further
expanded.
As to the partnership, the pass-through system should
be retained so long as the typical partnership has an
uncomplicated ownership structure. As to those partnerships with complex structures, if they impose a significant administrative burden on the Service to apply passthrough treatment, then criteria should be established
(by legislative action) to impose corporate tax treatment

for such partnerships. But, if this is necessary, the distinction should be based on factors that are easy to ascertain
even if the result is an arbitrary line of demarcation. The
criteria that are adopted should be aimed at identifying
organizations having a complicated form of ownership
for which it is difficult to administer a pass-through tax
system. For example, tiered partnership ownerships
might present such a problem. To date, however, the
Service appears able to administer Subchapter Keven
as to the more complex partnership forms . If so, the
pass-through system should be retained for all partnerships, and the restrictions on qualifications for Subchapter S treatment should be re-examined in light of the
experience with administering the more complicated
forms of partnership structures. ~
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